

PRESIDENT HO CHI MINH'S
NEW YEAR POEM

This Spring will by far outshine all the past springs.
The tidings of battles won will spread elation throughout the land.
South and North will vie in fighting U.S. foe
Forward!

Our total triumph is an assurance double surety

VIETNAM
COURIER

Information Weekly - 5th Year - No 154 - March 4, 1968
5, 7, 9 Tran Hung Dao Street, Hanoi - Democratic Republic of Viet Nam

From Jan. 29 to Feb. 26, 1968

HEROIC SOUTH VIET NAM WON TREMENDOUS, ALL-SIDED VICTORIES CHANGING WHOLE ASPECT OF WAR

- * Nearly All Parts of Countryside and Many Urban Areas Placed Under People's Control; 1,200,000 More People Freed; Revolutionary Rear Base Considerably Expanded.
- * More Than 290,000 Enemy Troops Put out of Action or Disbanded (Including 20,000 U.S. and Satellite Troops and 70,000 Puppet Soldiers Killed, Wounded or Captured).
- * Important Portion of Enemy Military Potential Destroyed.
- * Shattering Blows Dealt at Puppet Army and Administration.
- * Enemy "Pacification Programme" Reduced to Nothing.

(THIRD SPECIAL COMMUNIQUE OF P.L.A.F. COMMAND)



U.S. GOVERNMENT MUST BEAR FULL RESPONSIBILITY FOR CONTINUATION OF WAR

FOLLOWING the statements of Jan. 28, 1967 and Dec. 29, 1967, the statement of Feb. 8, 1968 of D.R.V.N. Foreign Minister Nguyen Duy Trinh to the AFP correspondent clearly indicated the way to talks between the D.R.V.N. and the United States. It once again made clear the just position and serious attitude of the Government of the Democratic Republic of Viet Nam and once again was given a warm reception by broad sections of world public opinion.

Everything has been made plain: Does the U.S. want talks with the D.R.V.N.? The D.R.V.N. is an independent and sovereign state which has fallen a victim to U.S.

(Continued page 4)

TO HUU

(Continued from page 1)

Mrs. Nguyen Thi Dinh, P.L.A.F. Deputy Commander-in-Chief, and P.L.A.F. women fighters.

VIETNAMESE WOMEN IN THE FACE OF AMERICAN AGGRESSION

On December 6, 1967 in Quang Binh, a 19-year-old girl, Nguyen Thi Xuan, shot down an American Phantom jet with five bullets. It was a lucky hit, but not an exceptional one. To date, more than 100 American jets have been brought down over the D.R.V.N. by brave units of militiamen.

"When the enemy comes, we the women will take to arms," runs an age-old popular saying. As early as the year 39, the two Trưng Sisters raised the banner of resistance to foreign aggression. Ever since then, the history of Viet Nam abounds in exploits achieved by her women in defence of the motherland. At present, when American aircraft—and American airships in the case of coastal provinces—have brought war to the remotest hamlets, there is no longer any "rule" even. Housewives and even old folks find themselves in the frontline. And so, in the D.R.V.N., the women have joined in the fight by the hundred of thousands. Those who are unarmed have engaged in anti-air or order-keeping work; they help artillery, mine, engineers' units build combat positions, carry ammunition, learn to handle A.A. guns so as to replace gunners wounded or killed in action. The percentage of women membership in the people's militia units rose from 2.5 per cent in 1965 to 3.45 per cent in 1966, and even to 10 per cent in certain regions. Women are also present on the communication front, repairing and building roads, bridges, railway tracks, canals, dykes, which are being ceaselessly pounded by American bombs.

Women also participate in the national struggle through their daily labour, and the role played by them in economic and cultural build-up grows ever more important, especially since the start of American aggression. The question is not only to assume production tasks, but also to bring about rapid economic progress, and replace them at technical and leading posts at all levels. Circumstances have placed on North Vietnamese women's shoulders new responsibilities and forced them to progress in all fields.

On the countryside, 65 per cent of the labour force is made up of women, who take on most of the responsibilities. At present, there are over 4,000 women

presidents or vice-presidents of agricultural co-operatives, and 54,000 others hold responsible posts in various branches of activity. The percentage of women in factory and State service personnel increased from 38.5 per cent in 1965 to 33.5 per cent in 1967. Forty-nine per cent of the medical personnel are women. More than 3,000 women are cabinet graduates and 13,000 others have finished secondary vocational school.

Women's participation in administrative and political functions has greatly increased since the start of the American aggression. Ever since then, the history of Viet Nam abounds in exploits achieved by her women in defence of the motherland. At present, when American aircraft—and American airships in the case of coastal provinces—have brought war to the remotest hamlets, there is no longer any "rule" even. Housewives and even old folks find themselves in the frontline. And so, in the D.R.V.N., the women have joined in the fight by the hundred of thousands. Those who are unarmed have engaged in anti-air or order-keeping work; they help artillery, mine, engineers' units build combat positions, carry ammunition, learn to handle A.A. guns so as to replace gunners wounded or killed in action. The percentage of women membership in the people's militia units rose from 2.5 per cent in 1965 to 3.45 per cent in 1966, and even to 10 per cent in certain regions. Women are also present on the communication front, repairing and building roads, bridges, railway tracks, canals, dykes, which are being ceaselessly pounded by American bombs.



since American aggression. In 1967, women made up 47.1 per cent and 45.9 per cent respectively of the number of people elected to the People's Councils. Each village or district administrative committee now has at least a woman president, vice-president or standing member.

The promotion of women is a policy advocated and practised by the Communist Party of Indo-China. Now the Viet Nam Workers' Party—ever since its founding in 1961—has been growing at the same rate as the political and social struggle, the first instance—against French colonialism—and the spreading of socialism. It has made a big step forward since the start of American aggression. In 1967, a campaign was launched to promote women to responsible posts, to do

away with prejudices—in women's, as well as men's minds—against their feminine advance, and provide material help to women with a view to helping them achieve quick progress in all fields. The Viet Nam Women's Union called on the women to tackle these tasks:

- Production work;
- Household duties; and
- Combat tasks.

In co-operation with the educational services, the Viet Nam Women's Union has opened nearly 3,000 special complementary education classes for women to enable them to assume their new combat tasks. At present, the infant classes have multiplied. In Hai Duong province for instance, 28,000 small children are looked after in creches, which exist in 50 per cent of the agricultural co-operatives. In 1966, the number of children attending infant classes increased by 30 per cent.

By that time a group of Liberation fighters had arrived at the villa which stood in the downtown Lu Thung Kiet Street, and started searching it thoroughly. But not a single American could be seen anywhere.

An old woman appeared on the scene. Grasping the hands of the soldiers, half-laughing, half-weeping: "O sons, how well you fought! They were completely caught off guard. Now let's take a good look. They must be somewhere in this building."

"Ah, what did I tell you," she screamed, pointing at a



thousand enemy officers and soldiers have been able to mount repeated attacks on Tan Son Nhut airbase—separated from downtown Saigon by about ten kilometers—only—shows that the people's war was tightening around U.S. and its quailings in Saigon so dangerously that the American brasshats were quoted by AFP on Feb. 19 as saying that the best way to prevent such attacks was to regularly station 300,000 soldiers around Saigon. In such a situation, what would the 100,000 soldiers requested by West-morland through Wheeler be able to do for the whole of the South Viet Nam battlefield?

In the flash of their victory, on Feb. 18 at 11 a.m. the revolutionary forces fired hundreds of shells onto the airfield, shaking windows of the city's houses. Meanwhile, revolutionary fighters stormed the airfield, putting out of action and capturing hundreds of airmen and technicians. The residence of General Westmorland was also shelled by a Bunker had to flee in the night. Tan Son Nhut airbase was a scene of flames. As admitted by UPI, at least seven big fires were seen.

At present, almost daily the P.L.A.F. artillery fire, sometimes two or three times a day, according to Vietnamese reports, up to now in this airfield nearly one

Brave Mother of Hue


A ROUSED from sleep by the firing, the American adviser "jumped out of bed then slipped on the floor for cover, without even caring to put on his slippers. But in whatever corner he tried he still found himself too conspicuous. At last, he ducked into the W.C. and shut himself up.

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car. "They haven't gone yet."

"Who is the owner of that car?" queried one fighter.

"That man himself," the mother answered.

"And who is that man?"

"Well, you know, the American colonel, the 'adviser' of the puppets in this town," the mother said, and went on with her search, which, finally, led her to the house.

It never occurred to her that the Yank would disagree himself by taking cover in such a place. She seized the door's knob and gave a pull.

"He must be in here," she called out suddenly, finding that the door was bolted from inside.

"Get out," she ordered. "Get out or I'll bash your head in."

A trembling voice could be heard from behind the door: "Please me, please... Spare me, please..."

The Liberation fighters rushed forward and, together with the old mother, dragged the Yank by his face pale with fear, out of his hiding.

"Spare me, please... Spare me, please..." the Yank kept repeating in Vietnamese, sniffing about all the time.

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CHAS IN SAIGON

In an attempt to slow down the collapse of the Saigon administration touched off by the stormy onslaught of the South Vietnamese forces and people, Bunker and the Thieu-Ky clique have painstakingly created what is called "Anti-Communist Front of National Salvation." Their intention is to use this organization for rallying the reactionary (local forces in Saigon to deal with the unprecedented growth and development of the South Vietnamese people's united front against U.S. aggression, and at the same time check the far-reaching impact of the Alliance of National Forces for Independence and Peace, which emerged in the revolutionary spirit this sweeping South Viet Nam's towns and cities. The public list including the names of intellectuals belonging to different opposition parties and presented them as members of the "Front" with the hope of using it to stir the moribund Saigon regime.

But the list proved a trumped-up list. According to

knowledgeable sources in Saigon, many of those listed have refused to adhere to the afore-said organization. Candidates for next year's "national elections" even strongly objected. Many observers in Saigon predict that the move will miscarry in the forthcoming days.

The disturbances now besetting the puppet administration and with misgivings about the dirty tricks on the part of the opposition, the Thieu-Ky junta has created more of its leaders, of whom those of the Buddhist movement, the students' movement and the legal trade unions.

Western news reports say that, with Ky's resignation from the presidency of the "National Rehabilitation Committee," the rift between Thieu and Ky keeps widening.

The above situation illustrates the utter isolation and the unending, ever-increasing, self-plagues the Saigon quailing administration.

News from SAIGON

DRY-SEASON FIRST-THREE-MONTH BALANCE-SHEET

At the beginning of this dry season, the Lao people have won big victories in all battlefields, *Pathet Lao Press Agency* announced.

During the first three months of the dry season (from November 1967 to the end of January 1968) the Lao people and army put out of action over 100 enemy troops.

They attacked 9 enemy regiments and battalion C.P.'s, many logistic bases, airfields and important communication lines, causing heavy losses to the enemy.

They captured 1,847 firearms of various kinds, hundreds of tons of munitions,

60 radio sets and a great quantity of military equipment. They also destroyed thousands of firearms, hundreds of tons of ammunition, shot down or destroyed 40 aircraft, sank 9 motor boats, destroyed 27 military vehicles, blew up 2 bridges, set 2 petrol dumps, 4 ammunition storages and many other war stores.

A dozen enemy posts and military positions illegally set up in the liberated zones were razed to the ground. Tens of thousands of people banded into camouflageed guerrilla units were liberated. The people's power was restored in 7 villages and 55 hamlets.

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FOREIGN OPINION

Utterly Inept Saigon Administration Has in Fact Collapsed

The recent successful P.L.A.F. attacks and popular uprisings in various towns and cities of South Viet Nam are of paramount strategic significance. In addition to military and political gains the patriots have fundamentally shattered the puppet army and administration, the prop of neo-colonialism in South Viet Nam. This is an open secret revealed by the Western press as testified by the following excerpts:

"No measures taken by Saigon to prevent this disintegration and the American are witnessing the founding of the protest for their presence in South Viet Nam: a so-called representative government has just been toppled, and their military support in South Viet Nam is an army of traitors and mercenaries whose morale and fighting have ever since been very low."

El Moudjahid (Feb. 19, 1968)

"Unrecoverable in the first 24 hours of the Viet Cong offensive and brought back to Saigon, the existence of the Americans, the President of South Viet Nam, General Thieu, like other members of his government, has given a proof of his ineffectiveness. Thieu, who has military and civilian officials are smashed the machine, and has given a poor show. Washington ruling circles affirmed that the massive presence of the Viet Cong offensive has brutally defeated the myth."

France-Sol (Feb. 8, 1968)

"The Saigon government has utterly failed to earn the confidence of the people. The South Vietnamese army has ceased to fight."

Stephan Young (UPI, Feb. 27, 1968)

"The Saigon political structure is no stronger today than it was at the outbreak of the sense of being able on its own to govern, to defend or to protect the people of South Viet Nam."

Mice Menfield (Reuters, Feb. 12, 1968)

mean more popularity for Johnson in an election year. Such measures would be understandable if they could improve U.S. lot in Viet Nam. Based on an intelligent observer can easily see, in the Viet Nam situation, that South Viet Nam, that defeat is inevitable for the American in view of the fact that 100,000 more G.I.'s do, when half a million of their life had proved powerless. American troops have been stretched to such a point that they would be completely submerged in the immense ocean of the people's war. More important reinforcements would lead them nowhere. Where are the reinforcements to be sent in the first place? To Ky? To Thieu? To Kham? Or to the hands of those evasive facts.

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The End of a Myth

(Continued from page 2)

the Americans. What can one say about a Nguyen Cao Ky who has publicly repudiated his admiration for Hitler?

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2. We know the war cannot be won militarily and there is a feeling that the combatants of the American people are the victims of the facts of the situation.

3. Recent events such as Viet Nam's on all South Viet Nam principal cities—even the capital of Saigon—show that the South Vietnamese government is utterly impotent, has in fact collapsed, and has no control over the country, despite our tremendous expenditures of money and lives, and dreadful losses among the Vietnamese people.

4. U.S. casualties are reaching dreadful proportions for a futile effort.

Ernest Gruening (AP, Feb. 24, 1968)

the family budgets of puppet soldiers and functionaries, themselves constantly off-balance, the lightest touch on the part of the Americans makes life unbearable to all groups and individuals hit by the puppet regime. The puppet regime is definitely unable to the U.S., have joined in the anti-U.S. struggle.

The filthy base of the puppet regime is collapsing: its component elements are crossing over to the side of the revolution. The formation of the Alliance of National Forces for Independence and Peace, that of the People's Revolutionary Committee in This Viet Nam—Hue, herald new, decisive steps in an irreversible process. All hope of catching up a more or less consistent puppet regime has definitely vanished. It can be nothing but a headless and homeless body.

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P.L.A.F. SCORE NEW VICTORIES:

BUE: Over 1,000 Enemy Troops Put out of Action.

HIGHWAY No 9: Ta Con Completely Encircled; Dong Ha, Con Tien under P.L.A.F. Artillery Fire.

NAM BO AND WESTERN HIGH PLATEAUX: Tan Son Nhut, Bien Hoa, Ben Tre Airfields Fought; U.S. Barracks at Cu Chi, Pleiku, Dakto, Kontum Violently Attacked.

BETWEEN Feb. 18 and 19, the P.L.A.F. continued to attack the enemy violently on all battlefields.

In Hue city they forced the enemy to show up in his desperate attempts to retake the city and inflicted heavy losses on him.

From Feb. 22 to 24, they foiled a dozen counter-attacks mounted by a dozen battalions of U.S. and puppet troops, harassed their rescue parties, killed or wounded nearly 1,000 enemy soldiers, put out of action one company, burned 15 military vehicles, including 13 M.113 armored carriers, sank 6 war vessels, downed 2 aircraft, and wiped out 2 resistance-nests set up in two dwelling houses.

On Feb. 27, the P.L.A.F. scored a direct hit at a U.S. landing craft on the Perfume River, 2 km north of Hue. The craft was blown up and many G.I.'s on board were killed.

As the situation grew tense in Hue, the battle raged on the front north of Highway No. 9. On Feb. 24 alone, the P.L.A.F. shot down 4 choppers, sank 4 vessels at Cu Viet and sent the bottom of 2 other boats at Dong Ha port. The following day, the P.L.A.F. tightened their encirclement around Ta Con, a few kilometers north of Khe Sanh. Seven G.I.'s who were repairing their materials and carrying away water brought in by choppers were killed by P.L.A.F. sniping fire. The rest ran back to their fortifications. When the enemy was compelled to send out troops to relieve the P.L.A.F. encirclement he had nearly one company wiped out, 117 U.S. Marines were killed on the battlefield. The defenders of Ta Con, under sniping fire and artillery shells, had to

dig in deep in their fortifications. In one day Ta Con was shelled four times. Its gun emplacements, radar site, ammunition dumps and aircraft parking ground were hit by the P.L.A.F. artillery. Five helicopters, a munition depot, a heavy gun and a military vehicle were destroyed. That is why on Feb. 26, the U.S. Command was forced to send out another clearing mission. Though progressing cautiously, the rescue party soon suffered heavy losses. Its advance party was nearly completely wiped out, having 78 men killed on the spot. The P.L.A.F. captured a great quantity of firearms including 45 machine guns and tommy-guns and two 60mm mortars.

In a co-ordinated action with Ta Con, on Feb. 26, the P.L.A.F. heavily shelled the petrol dump, explosive depots and aircraft parking field at **Dong Ha**; the petrol dump was set afire and the ammunition depot blown up. Many C-130 four-engine freighters and choppers were destroyed. Con Tien base and Heights 241 and 245 were heavily pounded and suffered great damage.

Fighting in the **Nam Bo** (South Viet Nam proper) battlefield was also fierce. On Feb. 27, the P.L.A.F. attacked simultaneously **Tan Son Nhut**, **Bien Hoa** airbases and **Thu Duc** cadet school (12 km from Saigon). The enemy admitted 39 P.L.A.F. killed or wounded and many aircraft destroyed or damaged. On Feb. 28, the P.L.A.F. intercepted a column of puppet paratroopers 6 km north of Tan Son Nhut airbase, causing many casualties among them; they also shelled the base of U.S. Infantry Division 23 at Cu Chi, 32 km northwest of Saigon.

In the **Dau Mot** province, north of Saigon, on the night of Feb. 17, the P.L.A.F. attacked and occupied Dau Tieng townlet, hammered at

the enemy in Hon Quan town, overran 6 posts along strategic Highway No. 13, shelled Lai Khe and the base of Regiment 8, puppet Division 5, and intercepted an enemy rescue party. In the battle given by the Yankee neo-colonialist formation 3 km north of the Dau Mot town, the P.L.A.F. entirely wiped out Battalion 1, Regiment 8, Division 5. On Feb. 20, they destroyed 11 tanks, overran a post and wiped out Company 16, Battalion 4, puppet Regiment 7, and captured 20 men in Cu Chi district.

60 km southwest of Saigon, the P.L.A.F. continued to attack the enemy within and around **My Tho** town. On Feb. 18 and 19, they foiled all the enemy's counter-attacks, causing nearly 500 enemy casualties and burning 8 M.113 armored carriers. On Feb. 25, they wiped out a U.S. motorized infantry battalion, destroyed 40 M.113 armored cars, 400 lorries and self-propelled guns of the enemy units clearing Highway No. 4.

Meanwhile, the P.L.A.F. continued to storm the remaining enemy bases in **Ben Tre** town. On the night of Feb. 23 alone, they caused heavy damage to the military sector C.P. and the airfield, rased many posts to the ground and destroyed many bridges.

In the **Western High Plateaux**, on the night of Feb. 18, the P.L.A.F. seized control of Da Lat, killing or wounding 357 enemy soldiers. On the night of Feb. 19, they hammered at Holloway camp, 3 km east of Pleiku town, in fluctuating airborn bases on the enemy. The following day, they assaulted many positions of U.S. Infantry Division 4, including those of Brigades 1 and 2 of the same division, 30 km west of Dakto and 18 km northeast of Kontum town.

RECENT events in South Viet Nam having given him the jitters, President Johnson dispatched General Wheeler to Saigon on a 3-day on-the-spot investigation. As soon as the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff returned to Washington, a war council was held and long sessions devoted to the search for a solution to a situation which was obviously a desperate one for the Yankee neo-colonialist undertaking.

Let us skip Wheeler's public declarations, which are but an expression of the widespread optimism in the Johnsonian tradition. Didn't he for instance proclaim, with great seriousness, that the South

— The war brought into the midst of Saigon itself what is subject to daily attacks and bombardments by the People's Liberation Armed Forces; the American forces reduced to the defensive, as admitted by Westmoreland himself; the American Command in disarray, not knowing what to do, completely in the dark as to the designs of its adversary.

— The U.S. "two-pronged strategy" doomed to failure; the famous "pacification" program gone bankrupt; the few villages having remained under U.S.-puppet control fallen in the people's hands beyond recovery; all forces having been withdrawn to

What Is General Wheeler Going to Propose to the White House?

Vietnamese people's *Tai* offensive had resulted in a heavy defeat for the patriots, that the puppet army had proved its worth in those dramatic days, that the American forces had by no means been caught by surprise, etc., etc. Almost every report in the Western American newspapers—press is a flat denial of such assertions. As to the tributes paid to the American hero, who assured him of President Johnson's "full confidence," it can be anything more than a stiffener for the sagging morale of the 500,000-strong American expeditionary corps?

Leaving the propaganda side out of count, the Wheeler mission must have sounded the alarm to the master of the White House. A somber picture indeed it had found in Saigon:

— A 1,200,000-strong army composed of American, satellite and puppet troops completely powerless, and suffering heavy losses, before the tidal wave of the people's assaults, which submerged the whole of South Viet Nam, including the urban lairs of the Americans and their puppets;

defend the cities;

— The puppet administration and army, the two pillars of U.S. neo-colonialism, in full disintegration; the third of the Saigon troops disbanded, the rest thrown into disarray, their morale sinking and their combativeness vanishing fast; the Thieu Ky clique, more and more isolated and torn up by internal rivalries (exacerbated by defeat), as evidenced by arrests in Saigon and purges of senior officers of the puppet army;


— Beyond the frontiers of South Viet Nam, the ever-more difficult position of the Americans and their "local allies" in Laos, under the blows of the Lao patriots, while North Viet Nam, the Great Red of the Southern revolutionary forces, stands firmer than ever.

Such was the situation before General Wheeler's eyes. Now, what could he recommend to the White House?

As stressed by an AFP correspondent in a despatch from Saigon on Feb. 23, "it is from such bitter facts that one must work out

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REPEATED ATTACKS ON TAN SON NHAT AIRBASE



Tan Son Nhut airfield after P.L.A.F. Feb. 17 night raid

TAN SON NHAT is the fifth busiest airport in the world. The H.Q. of General Westmoreland is located there. The enemy brag that this airbase is protected by 21 rows of barbed wire and various kinds of mines, patrolled every 15 minutes in the night by a U.S. convoy and possesses a system of powerful searchlights which can light up a region within dozen kilometres, thus making it impossible for any Liberation fighter to sneak in. Yet between Jan. 31 and Feb. 27, 1968, this airbase was the target of more than ten powerful attacks of the revolutionary armed forces of Saigon-Gia Dinh.

On Jan. 31, at 2.30 a.m., after a heavy artillery shelling, the Liberation fighters broke into the airfield in many columns and assaulted

many times the U.S. Staff. The clatter of rifles, machine guns and explosions of hand grenades resounded from all sides. Taken unaware, the U.S. and the puppet commands were in a turmoil, their rank - and file, fled helter-skelter. The commander of U.S. Air Wing No 7 had to call in armed helicopters from other places to bomb the barracks with a great number of wounded puppet soldiers had been evacuated. As most of the searchlights were destroyed, the enemy had to smudge up flames without let-up to get control of the area.

The following day, the revolutionary forces occupied the northern and southern parts of the airbase and other places. On the night of Feb. 3, they struck directly

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